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I. INTRODUCTION
Four years ago, Blake Ripple was a household name in the greater Austin,
1
Texas area when anyone talked about high school football. However, over the
course of his high school career, Ripple’s doctors believe that he suffered
“anywhere from thirty to forty concussions and sub-concussive hits while
2
playing football.” Once a member of the National Honor Society, an Academic
All-District student, star defensive lineman, and Division I college football
recruit, the effects of the subsequent preventable concussions that Ripple
3
sustained changed his life forever. In the fall of 2009, Ripple sustained one of
4
the final concussions of his career during a game. Although Ripple suffered from
and complained of constant headaches, nausea, numbness to one side of his body,
5
and dizziness throughout the remainder of the 2009 school year and into the
2010 football season, Ripple’s coach allegedly “force[d],” him to return-to-play
6
before his initial brain injury healed. Now, due in part to his coach’s alleged
7
negligent acts, Ripple cannot play football, go to college, or live independently.
Over the past five years, the rising numbers of reported concussions in the
8
National Football League (NFL), pending concussion litigation by former

1. See Complaint at 2, Ripple v. Marble Falls Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1:12-cv-00827-LY (W. Dist. Tex.
Sept. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Ripple Complaint] (discussing that some Division I college football programs
demonstrated interest in offering Ripple a scholarship). The Complaint reflects the most current procedural
posture of this case. Id.
2. Id. at 8.
3. Id. at 2–8.
4. Id. at 4.
5. Ripple’s symptoms are common side effects of a concussion. What Are the Potential Effects of TBI?,
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/TraumaticBrainInjury/outcomes.html (last
visited Jan. 31, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
6. Ripple Complaint, supra note 1, at 6–7.
7. Id. at 8.
8. See Concussion Watch, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ concussion-watch/ (last visited
Feb. 19, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (tracking all reported concussions in the NFL). PBS
and ESPN collaborated to track all concussions listed on the NFL teams’ injury reports. Id.
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players against the NFL, and the suicides of former players linked to head
trauma have combined to increase the public’s awareness about the potential
10
dangers of concussions in all levels of football. This public health issue has
11
12
affected how parents, coaches, high schools, universities, and the government
view player safety, concussion management, and concussion treatment in youth,
13
high school, and college football. The NFL has led the way in increasing the
14
safety of the game and mitigating the harmful effects of concussions.
The NFL has access to cutting-edge medical research and technology and can
15
also institute the highest possible safety measures. As a result, the league has
made strides to reduce the negative effects of concussions in all levels of
16
football. The NFL has focused on a few areas in particular to combat the effects
9. See generally Amended Complaint at 24–27, In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12md-02323-AB (E.D.PA. July 17, 2012), MDL No. 2323, available at http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?page
_id=18 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter Master Complaint] (asserting various causes of
action against the NFL regarding concussions).
10. See Alan Schwarz, Duerson’s Brain Trauma Diagnosed, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/sports/football/03duerson.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(discussing the post-suicide autopsy of former Chicago Bear defensive back Dave Duerson); Mike Tierney,
Football Player Who Killed Himself Had Brain Disease, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2012), http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/07/27/sports/football/ray-easterling-autopsy-found-signs-of-brain-disease-cte.html (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (asserting that a post-suicide autopsy of former Atlanta Falcons defensive
back Ray Easterling revealed the presence of the brain disease, chronic traumatic encephalopathy, or CTE);
Mark Fainaru-Wada et al., Doctors: Junior Seau’s Brain Had CTE, ESPN (Jan. 11, 2013, 6:32 PM),
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/8830344/study-junior-seau-brain-shows-chronic-brain-damage-foundother-nfl-football-players (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (illustrating that during a post-suicide
autopsy, doctors determined that Seau suffered from CTE). While Duerson, Easterling, and Seau are the only
former NFL players who committed suicide due in part to repeated head trauma, they represent a growing trend
of retired NFL players that suffer from neurocognitive diseases after their playing career. See Nadia Kounang,
Football Players More Likely to Develop Neurodegenerative Disease, Study Finds, CNN (Sept. 6, 2012, 12:35
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/05/health/nfl-neurodegenerative-disease/index.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (“[A] new study suggests that professional football players are three times more likely
to have neurodegenerative diseases than the general population.”). The study also showed that NFL players are
four times more likely to develop Alzheimer’s and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), or Lou Gherig’s
disease, than the general public. Id.
11. Stephanie Cary, Tackling the Danger of Concussions: Documentary Raises Severity of Injury, How to
Prevent It, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 26, 2012), available at 2012 WLNR 1822692 (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
12. Recently, President Barack Obama asserted, “[I]f I had a son, I’d have to think long and hard before I
let him play football.” Franklin Foer & Chris Hughes, Barack Obama Is Not Pleased: The President on His
Enemies, the Media, and the Future of Football, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 27, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.
com/article/112190/obama-interview-2013-sit-down-president# (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The
President also addressed his concerns with college athletes who suffer concussions and “have nothing to fall
back on,” in terms of medical benefits or care. Id.
13. Cary, supra note 11.
14. NFL EVOLUTION, http://www.nflevolution.com/nfl-timeline/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2012) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
15. See Master Complaint, supra note 9, at 3–4 (explaining the NFL has historically taken on the role as
“guardian” of player safety in football).
16. See generally id. at 4–5 (arguing that the NFL has historically taken on the duty to properly inform
players of the dangers of concussions).
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of concussions: the league’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA); concussion
policies and guidelines; and the medical practices used by team doctors. These
policies have created industry customs that shape the standard of care in
concussion management.
This Comment argues that the NFL’s measures to address concussions have
created industry customs in concussion management that all lower levels of
football should adopt. Such an adoption would increase the long-term health of
players and shield coaches and schools from tort liability. If adopted, these
changes will ensure that coaches and schools meet the standard of care for
concussion management in negligence actions, will have a positive long-term
effect on players’ health, and will lower the risk of litigation brought by players
17
against governing bodies, leagues, schools, and coaches. Part II gives a general
overview of concussions from a medical perspective. It also discusses how the
NFL has historically dealt with concussions and its efforts to make football safer.
Part III explains how the pending concussion litigation involving former players
against the NFL changed the NFL’s culture of concussion management. It also
illustrates actions that the National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) and
various states took to combat the concussion epidemic. Part IV outlines factors
that limit liability for concussion injuries in football and how customs impact the
standard of care in a negligence case. Part V argues that states, governing bodies,
and universities should adopt the NFL’s concussion policies regarding return-toplay, education, baseline testing, and the amount of contact during practices. Part
VI asserts that should adoption happen on a large scale, these policies will
increase players’ health during and after their playing careers, which will
inherently lower the probability of future litigation brought by players.
II. CONCUSSION OVERVIEW
This Part explains how concussions medically affect a player’s brain and
their historical link to football. Section A briefly discusses concussions from a
medical perspective. Section B gives a short history of how concussions are
connected to football. Section C discusses rule changes that the NFL
implemented to increase the health and safety of players. Section D examines the
failures of the former Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee (MTBI
Committee) to adequately address concussions in professional football. Part E
illustrates the efforts that NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell has taken to address
concussions.

17. While the concussion management procedures addressed in this Comment are generally applicable to
all sports, this Comment intentionally limits its scope to football.
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A. Medical Diagnosis of a Concussion
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), “a
concussion is a type of traumatic brain injury” (TBI) that occurs when the head
or body receives a blow that causes the brain to accelerate and decelerate quickly
18
in the skull. The force of the blow disrupts normal neurological functions of the
19
brain. The brain will normally heal from most TBI or concussions, but during
the healing process, the brain is much more susceptible to aggravation or re20
injury. The effects of a concussion can range from short-term effects such as
21
headaches, memory loss, and reduced mental cognition, to long-term
complications such as depression, seizures, and brain disease if not treated
22
properly. Proper treatment is paramount in youth and college football players
because a developing brain is more susceptible to re-injury or aggravation before
23
it fully heals from a concussion.
B. A Brief History of Concussions in Football and Beyond
24

In 1905, football as we know it almost ended. The deaths of eighteen
college football players in 1905 led some people to call for the abolition of
25
football. A few years before the advent of professional football in America,
President Theodore Roosevelt called the leaders of the Harvard, Yale, and
Princeton football teams to Washington D.C. in order to create rules that would

18. Concussion and Mild TBI, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 27, 2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/Concussion/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Brain Animation: Digital View of a
Concussion, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/concussion/
HeadsUp/clinicians/resource_center/brain_animation.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
19. Brain Animation: Digital View of a Concussion, supra note 18.
20. Id.
21. What Are the Potential Effects of TBI?, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.
cdc.gov/TraumaticBrainInjury/outcomes.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
22. See Resource Center: Complications of Concussion, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION ,
http://www.cdc.gov/concussion/HeadsUp/clinicians/resource_center/complications_of_concussion.html
(last
visited Feb. 19, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (asserting various complications from
concussions including “[p]ost-[c]oncussion [s]yndrome . . . [c]onvulsive [m]otor [p]henomena . . . [p]ost[t]raumatic [s]eizures . . . [s]econd-[i]mpact [s]yndrome . . . [c]hronic [t]raumatic [e]ncephalopathy (CTE) . . .
[d]epression . . . [and] [m]ild-[c]ognitive [i]mpairment).
23. Richard H. Adler, Youth Sports and Concussions: Preventing Preventable Brain Injuries. One Client,
One Cause, and a New Law, 22 PHYSICAL MED. & REHAB. CLINICS OF N. AM. 721, 722 (2011) [Preventing
Preventable Brain Injuries].
24. Douglas E. Abrams, Confronting the Youth Sports Concussion Crisis: A Central Role for Responsible
Local Enforcement of Playing Rules, 2 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 75, 76 (2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
25. Id.
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26

make football safer. Roosevelt advocated for and ultimately succeeded in
27
implementing rules that focused on preventing brain injuries.
As contact sports like football and boxing progressed, the medical
28
community, as early as 1928, began linking concussions to brain disease. Over
the years, the scientific and medical community continued to develop evidence
29
linking repeated concussions to brain disease in football players and boxers,
while at the same time people outside of the scientific committee made the same
30
practical inferences.
31
The CDC estimates that 1.7 million Americans receive a TBI each year. Of
that number, 173,285 youth athletes suffer from reported sports-related
32
concussions; recent studies show the greatest number of these sports-related
33
concussions occur in youth football.

26. Id. at 78.
27. Id. at 78–79.
28. See Harrison S. Martland, Punch Drunk, 91 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1103, 1103–04 (1928) (asserting that
nearly half of boxers developed brain abnormalities if they continued to box for a long period of time).
29. See generally Master Complaint, supra note 9, at 1–5 (describing findings of various concussion
studies from 1928–1991).
30. See Bob Dylan, Who Killed Davey Moore? (Columbia 2004) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (singing about a boxer who died in the ring due to head trauma).
“‘Not me,” says the boxing writer, [p]ounding print on his old typewriter. Saying, ‘Boxing ain’t to blame
[t]here’s just as much danger in a football game.’ Saying, ‘Fistfighting is here to stay. It’s just the old American
way.’” Id. For example, running a search for the term “concussion” on Twitter or Google merits enough
substantial results to write any number of scientific or law review articles. Twitter topic search, TWITTER
https://twitter.com/search?q=concussion &src=typd (search “concussion;” then follow search hyperlink to
results) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
31. Mark Faul et al., TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY IN THE UNITED STATES: EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT
VISITS, HOSPITALIZATIONS & DEATHS 2002–2006 7 (CDC eds. 2010). The CDC compiled the number of
traumatic brain injuries from data collected from the National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey,
National Hospital Discharge Survey, and National Vital Statistics Survey. Id. at 49–50.
32. See Julie Gilchrist et al., Nonfatal Traumatic Brain Injuries Related to Sports and Recreation
Activities Among Persons Aged ≤ 19 Years—United States, 2001–2009, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REPORT 1, 1–2 (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/index2011.html (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review); Take Concussions Out of Play: Learn to Prevent, Recognize, and Respond to Concussions, CTR.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 9, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/features/protectyoungathletes/ (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
33. See Kate Snow et al., Concussion Crisis Growing in Girls’ Soccer, ROCK CENTER (May 9, 2012, 9:50
AM),
http://rockcenter.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/05/09/11604307-concussion-crisis-growing-in-girls-soccer
?lite (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (detailing the prevalence of concussions in girls soccer and the
rising safety concerns about the sport). Girls soccer has the second highest concussion rate among youth sports,
with football having the highest concussion rate. Id.
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C. NFL Rule Changes Over Time
34

Since its inception in 1922, the NFL has implemented equipment standards,
35
in-game rules, and procedures to ensure player safety. Starting in 1920 and
continuing each decade thereafter, the NFL continually upgraded protective
36
equipment, such as helmets and padding. Moreover, the NFL instituted
numerous rules intended to increase player safety, from roughing the passer
37
(1939) to the current rules that protect defenseless players (2010–2011).
D. The Failures of the Initial MTBI Committee
In 1994, under the leadership of former Commissioner Paul Tagliabue, the
NFL created the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee (MTBI Committee) to
38
research the effects of brain injuries on NFL players. The formation of the
MTBI Committee represented the NFL taking steps to officially address the
39
concussion issue in football. The MTBI Committee, with the stated purpose of
“improving player safety” and “instituting ‘rule changes aimed at reducing head
injuries,’” authored sixteen papers from 2003–2009. It asserted the cumulative
effect of repeated concussions suffered by NFL players did not result in any
40
neurological damage or brain disease. At the time, the medical community
widely criticized the papers published by the MTBI Committee because its denial
of a causal link between concussions and long-term negative effects contradicted
41
nearly all accepted and validated medical studies. Furthermore, the NFL Head,
42
Neck, and Spine Medical Committee (Medical Committee), formed in 2010,
validated the medical community by criticizing the work of the previous MTBI

34. In 1920, the American Professional Football Association (APFA) became the first professional
football league; it later became the NFL in 1922. NFL EVOLUTION, http://www.nflevolution.com/nfltimeline/index. html (last visited Nov. 9, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
35. Id.
36. See id. (illustrating the helmet upgrades implemented by the league). The NFL mandated the wearing
of helmets in 1943, implemented the first plastic padded helmet in 1950, mandated the universal wear of
facemasks on helmets in 1962, introduced the full facemask in 1972, and introduced the facemask grill in 1990,
which modern helmets currently incorporate. Id.
37. Id. (noting the increase in the number of rule changes increasing player safety each decade, beginning
in the 1970s, as medical research linking concussions to brain disease and neurological damage became more
prevalent).
38. Master Complaint, supra note 9, at 4, 36, 38.
39. See id. at 23–32 (listing studies from 1928–2010 that linked repeated head trauma and/or concussions
to brain disease).
40. Id. at 35. One paper stated, “[p]layers who are concussed and return to the same game have fewer
initial signs and symptoms than those removed from play. Return to play does not involve a significant risk of a
second injury either in the same game or during the season.” Id. at 42.
41. Id. at 35–38.
42. The Medical Committee replaced the MTBI Committee in 2010 after the league effectively dissolved
the leadership on the MTBI committee. Id. at 47.
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Committee, calling it “not acceptable by any modern standards.” This statement
43
illustrated the NFL’s new resolve to properly address concussions.
E. Commissioner Goodell’s Push for a Safer Game
Less than a year after Roger Goodell took over as commissioner of the NFL
44
45
in 2006, he held the first ever “league-wide concussion summit.” While the
summit marked a turning point in the league in terms of actively addressing
concussions, the NFL remained hesitant to link concussions to long-term health
46
problems. Goodell and the NFL soon came under pressure from Congress to
47
discuss the long-term health risks associated with concussions. After an autopsy
of former NFL player Chris Henry demonstrated signs of Chronic Traumatic
48
Encephalopathy (CTE), and a University of Michigan study found that NFL
players ages 30–49 are nineteen times more likely to suffer from Alzheimer’s
49
disease, Congress held hearings in 2009 and 2010. At these hearings, Goodell
50
and MTBI Committee co-chairman Dr. Ira Casson testified. In both hearings,
Goodell and Casson would not admit an existing link between concussions and
51
brain disease. Following the hearings, Goodell replaced the MTBI Committee

43. Id.
44. Jim Corbett, Tagliabue Hands Off to Goodell as NFL’s Next Commissioner, USA TODAY (Aug. 9,
2006, 6:00 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2006-08-08-goodell-commissioner_x.htm
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
45. See Jeanne Marie Laskas, Game Brain, G.Q. (October 2009), http://www.gq.com/sports/profiles/
200909/nfl-players-brain-dementia-study-memory-concussions (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(explaining that the doctors invited by Goodell to present at the summit provided contrary data regarding
concussions in comparison to the NFL’s MTBI Committee). The MTBI Committee attacked the findings of Dr.
Bennet Omalu, presented by Dr. Julian Bailes, linking repeated concussions suffered by former Pittsburgh
Steeler Mike Webster to his diagnosis of CTE discovered during an autopsy as “flawed.” Id.
46. See id. (explaining that the NFL contradicted the contrary evidence provided by outside medical
professionals linking concussions to long-term brain injuries).
47. Associated Press, Conyers Wants Review of All Data, ESPN (Oct. 28, 2009, 9:36 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4601966 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
48. What is CTE?, BOSTON UNIV. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF TRAUMATIC ENCEPHALOPATHY (2013),
http://www.bu.edu/cste/about/what-is-cte/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Chronic Traumatic
Encephalopathy . . . is a progressive degenerative disease of the brain found in athletes (and others) with a
history of repetitive brain trauma, including symptomatic concussions as well as asymptomatic subconcussive
hits to the head.”).
49. Master Complaint, supra note 9, at 44–47; Associated Press, Conyers Wants Review of All Data,
ESPN (Oct. 28, 2009, 9:36 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4601966 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); Alan Schwarz, Congress Examines N.F.L. Concussions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/sports/football/05concussions.html?_r=0 (on file with McGeorge Law
Review).
50. Master Complaint, supra note 9, at 44; Conyers Wants Review of All Data, supra note 49; Alan
Schwarz, supra note 49.
51. Master Complaint, supra note 9, at 44–47; Conyers Wants Review of All Data, supra note 49; Alan
Schwarz, supra note 49.
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52

with the current Medical Committee. In 2009, the NFL officially recognized the
link between traumatic brain injuries (resulting from concussions) and brain
53
disease.
Since 2011, more than 4,800 former players (in 242 individual suits) have
sued the NFL alleging that the league negligently and fraudulently misled the
54
players regarding the severity and long-term effects of concussions. The current
litigation is a byproduct of mounting medical data linking repeated concussions
to brain disease coupled with the NFL’s historically inadequate management of
55
concussions. The build-up to the current litigation also served as a catalyst for
the NFL to initiate significant policy changes regarding concussions and head
56
injuries.
The NFL’s most recent efforts regarding the concussion issue include
enacting further in-game rule changes to increase safety, publicly supporting
state legislation adopting concussion laws, actively inserting itself into the public
sphere of concussion awareness, partnering with the US military to share TBI
data, donating $30 million in funding for medical research to the Foundation for
the National Institutes of Health, and commissioning a new health and safety
57
report. All of these current efforts highlight the NFL’s response to the
58
concussion litigation that former players have brought against the NFL.
III. HOW THE CURRENT NFL CONCUSSION LITIGATION SPARKED CHANGE IN
THE CULTURE OF CONCUSSION MANAGEMENT
This Part identifies the actions the NFL has taken through the CBA, the
Medical Committee, and the Commissioner to tackle the concussion issue. It also
52. Master Complaint, supra note 9, at 47.
53. SPORTS LEGACY INST., http://sportslegacy.org/about-sports-legacy-institute/sli-achievements/ (last
visited Nov. 12, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
54. Paul D. Anderson, Plaintiffs/Former Players, NFL CONCUSSION LITIG. (Feb. 22, 2013),
http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?page_id=274 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Including the
spouses of former players, there are over 5,800 plaintiffs suing the NFL for damages. Id. This figure has
continued to grow since 2011. See Nathan Fenno & Luke Rosiak, NFL Concussion Lawsuits, WASHINGTON
TIMES (Dec. 20, 1013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/footballinjuries/ (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (listing all of the plaintiffs in the NFL concussion lawsuit).
55. See generally Master Complaint, supra note 9.
56. Compare infra Part III (discussing how the NFL handled concussions over time), with Master
Complaint, supra note 9, at 4. Note: The NFL and former players reached a preliminary settlement of the
lawsuit in August 2013 of $760 million. Doug Farrar, Judge Anita Brody Denies Preliminary Approval for NFL
Concussion Settlement, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 14, 2014), http://nfl.si.com/2014/01/14/nfl-concussionlawsuit-settlement-2/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). However, District Court Judge Anita Brody
denied the preliminary motion for settlement asserting that the agreement “lack[ed] of documentation regarding
the fairness of the final monetary figure, and whether the players involved would be diagnosed and paid
properly based on their claims.” Id.
57. See NFL EVOLUTION, http://www.nflevolution.com/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2012) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (chronicling all advancements in concussion awareness by the NFL since 2010).
58. Infra Part III.
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considers the NFL’s current impact on college and youth football. Section A
identifies the specific areas that the NFL addressed regarding concussions.
Section B discusses concussion management at the college level. Section C gives
an overview of current state concussion laws.
A. Identifying and Implementing Concussion Solutions from Litigation Issues
1. Concussion Issues Addressed in the CBA
It doesn’t take a brain surgeon to understand that less exposure to contact
59
situations diminishes the chances of suffering a concussion. Medical studies
60
since 1928 have linked repeated blows to the head, resulting in multiple
61
traumatic brain injuries, to long-term health problems and brain disease. In
62
2011, the NFL and NFL Players Association (NFLPA) agreed in their CBA to
63
64
limit “contact” practices during pre-season, season, and post-season.
During pre-season “two-a-day” training camp, players can only practice once
65
per day in pads. Furthermore, teams can only practice on the field for four hours
66
67
per day, of which only three can be padded. The CBA limits the second
practice to “‘walk-through’ instruction” without pads, and it must start no earlier
68
than three hours after the first practice session.

59. See Associated Press, Steelers Hoping Less Contact Equals Longer Careers, THE SCORE (Dec. 20,
2011), http://www.thescore.com/nfl/articles/156408-steelers-hoping-less-contact-equals-longer-careers (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing how several players on the Pittsburg Steelers, a team known for its
physical play, think that less contact in practice will lead to increased health in the long-term).
60. See Martland, supra note 28 (asserting that boxers who suffered repeated blows to the head suffered
from side effects such as being “‘cuckoo,’ ‘goofy,’ ‘cutting paper dolls,’ or ‘slug nutty’”).
61. See Ann C. McKee et al., The Spectrum of Disease in Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, BRAIN: A
J. OF NEUROLOGY 1, 2 (2012). CTE was originally reported in 1928 by Harrison Martland, a New Jersey
pathologist, who described the clinical aspects of a progressive neurological deterioration . . . that occurred after
repetitive brain trauma in boxers. . . . [T]he recognition that activities other than boxing were associated with its
development lead to the preferred use of terms such as progressive traumatic encephalopathy and later, CTE. Id.
62. The NFLPA is the union that represents all players in the NFL. NFL PLAYERS ASS’N,
https://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
63. The NFL CBA defines contact as “‘live’ blocking, tackling, pass rushing, [and] bump-and- run” and
“one-on-one offensive linemen vs. defensive linemen pass rush or pass protection drills, . . . wide receivers vs.
defensive backs bump-and-run drills, and . . . one-on-one special teams drills involving both offense and
defense.” NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 21 §§ 2, 5 (2011) [hereinafter NFL CBA].
64. Id. at art. 23 §§ 1, 24. There are also no “padded” practices allowed during the first three days of
training camp. Id. at art. 23.
65. Id. at art. 23 § 6(a). “[A] ‘padded practice’ shall be defined as a practice in which players are required
to wear helmets and shoulder pads, in addition to any other equipment required by the Club.” Id. at art. 24 §
1(c).
66. The three-hour clock for padded practices starts when “position coaches begin to coach players on the
field.” Id. at art. 23 § 6.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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During the regular season (the first seventeen weeks of the season), the CBA
69
authorizes teams to have a total of fourteen “padded” practices. They must
conduct eleven of the fourteen practices within the first eleven weeks of the
70
regular season. During the final six weeks of the season, teams may have three
71
padded practices. Teams may use discretion in deciding what day to hold
padded practices, but padded practices generally fall in the middle of the week,
72
which gives a three to four day buffer between padded practices and games.
If a team qualifies for the post-season, the CBA authorizes it to have one
73
padded practice per week. The day of the padded practice is also subject to the
74
discretion of the team.
The current NFL CBA also broadly addressed the right of medical care for
75
players with respect to concussions. All teams must have medical consultants
76
that have certifications in neurology and neuropsychology. Moreover, the
neurologist must have board certifications in “neurosurgery, . . . sports medicine,
emergency medicine, or psychiatry, with extensive experience in mild and
77
moderate brain trauma.” The CBA makes the NFLPA Medical Director a voting
78
member of every health and safety committee. This increases player awareness
of concussions and directly involves the NFL player’s union in shaping
79
concussion management rules in the league.
The CBA additionally created the Accountability and Care Committee,
80
which “provide[s] advice and guidance” on a number of issues. These include:
credentialing standards and educational programs of teams’ medical personnel;
81
standardized pre- and post-season medical examinations; educational methods
to inform players of the risks inherent in football and the role of the team medical
personnel in treating injuries; conducting research regarding prevention and

69. Id. at art. 24 § 1(a); see also supra note 64 (defining padded practices).
70. Id. at art. 24 § 1(a). “[Teams] may hold two padded practices during the same week during one week
of the regular season, provided that such week falls within the first eleven weeks of the regular season.” Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see also Doug Chapman, Doug’s Dish: A Typical Week in the NFL, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N (Nov.
13, 2009), https://www.nflplayers.com/Articles/Public-News/Doug%E2%80%99s-Dish-A-Typical-Week-inthe-NFL/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (asserting that teams generally hold padded practices on
Wednesday during the regular season). Note: The general rule of padded practices applies to games played on
Sundays and Monday Nights but does not take into account games played on Thursday or Saturday. NFL CBA,
supra note 63, at art. 24 § 1(a).
73. NFL CBA, supra note 63, at art. 24 § 1(b).
74. Id.
75. Id. at art. 39 § 1.
76. Id. at art. 39 § 1(b)(i) (emphasizing the words “head trauma” after the Neurologist requirement).
77. Id. at art. 39.
78. Id. at 39 § 1(d).
79. Id.
80. Id. at art. 39 § 3.
81. All pre-season physicals must include a neuropsychological baseline test. Id. at Appendix K Standard
Minimum Preseason Physical Examination.
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treatment methods of football related injuries; and methods of injury
82
surveillance. It also clearly states that the standard of care for medical treatment
is each team’s “best efforts to ensure that its players are provided with medical
83
care consistent with professional standards for the industry.”
2. Concussion Issues Addressed by League Policies
Toward the end of the regular season in 2009, the NFL updated its return-to84
play policy and adopted a stricter and more thorough policy. The key provisions
of the policy dictate that teams must remove a player who suffers a concussion
from play. The player cannot return-to-play until he is free of concussion
symptoms, passes neurological and neuropsychological examinations and tests,
and the team physician, as well as an independent neurological consultant, clears
85
him to play in writing.
Prior to the 2011 season, the NFL introduced the “NFL Sideline Concussion
Assessment Protocol,” which teams use as a guideline to assess players suspected
86
of suffering a concussion. The NFL also instituted the “Madden Rule,” which
mandates that “if a player is diagnosed with a concussion and removed from a
game, he must leave the field . . . escorted [by] . . . a member of the medical
87
staff” for observation. In 2012, the NFL focused on increasing concussion
awareness by ensuring teams, players, and officials received more education on
88
the signs and symptoms of concussions. It also updated the NFL Sideline
89
Concussion Assessment Protocol and removed players from the field
immediately upon suspicion of a concussion, as opposed to after diagnosis.
Significantly, the league implemented a policy of adding independent certified
athletic trainers to a press box area equipped with video replay access and
communications to each team’s medical staff to monitor for potential
90
concussions missed by teams on the field of play. Since 2009, the average

82. Id. at art. 39 § 3(a), (c).
83. Id. at § 3(c) (emphasis added).
84. Press Release, NFL, NFL Adopts Stricter Statement on Return-to-Play Following Concussions (Dec.
2, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter NFL Press Release].
85. Id.
86. Memorandum from the Co-Chairs of the NFL Head, Neck and Spine Comm. to Team Physicians,
Team ATCs, Team Neurological Consultants (2011) [hereinafter NFL Memo] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review). If a player fails the sideline exam, he is subject to the 2009 return-to-play policy. Id.
87. Id.
88. See NFL, FALL 2012 HEALTH & SAFETY REPORT 2, 7–9 (2012) [hereinafter NFL HEALTH & SAFETY
REPORT] (explaining the different educational programs provided by the NFL in 2012).
89. Id. at 8; see also NFL SIDELINE CONCUSSION ASSESSMENT TOOL (2012) (asserting that the sideline
test is “a guide derived from the Standardized Concussion Assessment Tool 2 (SCAT2) . . . and represents
a standardized method of evaluating NFL players for concussion consistent with the reasonable, objective
practice of the health care profession”).
90. HEALTH & SAFETY REPORT, supra note 88, at 8.
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number of reported concussions per game has risen from 5.4 to 8.4 and increased
91
by more than nine percent in 2013. These statistics indicate that the concussion
management policies in place by the NFL have contributed to better recognition
92
of initial concussion injuries on the field. By removing injured players from
play immediately and ensuring that they do not return-to-play before they are
93
fully healed, the policies benefit the players’ long-term health.
B. Current Concussion Management at the College Level
Before the 2011 season, the NCAA did not have rules in place to govern
94
concussion management. Prior to that fall sports season, each division of the
95
NCAA (I, II, and III) “adopted [identical] legislation requiring each member
96
institution to have a concussion management plan.” Although the NCAA does
not mandate any concussion management policies, they do support institutions
97
implementing a return-to-play policy that keeps players off of the field until
98
they are asymptomatic. It also recommends neuropsychological baseline testing
99
for players. Some schools, such as the University of Georgia, have developed
100
thorough and effective concussion policies. However, across all divisions of the
91. Steve Fainaru & Mark Fainaru-Wada, Inside the Numbers: Counting Concussions in the NFL, PBS
(Dec. 13, 2012, 8:57 AM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sports/concussion-watch/inside-thenumbers-counting-concussions-in-the-nfl/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
92. Concussion research and evidence of a higher risk of long-term brain disease in former players
suggests that the discovery of the dangers of concussions is not new or a growing problem, but that the new
policies have increased awareness, which has led to policy changes in the NFL that improved concussion
management. See Deborah Blum, Will Science Take the Field?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A25 (discussing
that science has linked repeated head injuries to long-term health problems).
93. Infra Part V.A.
94. NCAA, Behind the Blue Disc (Apr. 11, 2011), available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/
public/NCAA/Resources/Behind+the+Blue+Disk+landing+page (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
95. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 3.2.4.17 [hereinafter D-I MANUAL], available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/s-13-Manuals.aspx (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“An active
member institution shall have a concussion management plan for its student-athletes.”); NCAA DIVISION II
MANUAL art. 3.2.4.17 [hereinafter D-II MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/s-13Manuals.aspx (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); NCAA DIVISION III MANUAL art. 3.2.4.16 [hereinafter
D-III MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/s-13-Manuals.aspx (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review). Division I, II, and III all use the exact same language in their respective concussion management
plan articles. D-I MANUAL art. 3.2.4.17; D-II MANUAL art. 3.2.4.17; D-III MANUAL art. 3.2.4.16. Each plan must
include, but is not limited to, an annual educational requirement for student-athletes; a removal requirement if a
player demonstrates the signs and symptoms of a concussion; and a return-to-play requirement that a player
cannot return in the same day, and that a player can only return after being medically cleared from a doctor or
the doctor’s designee. D-I MANUAL art. 3.2.4.17; D-II MANUAL art. 3.2.4.17; D-III MANUAL art. 3.2.4.16.
96. NCAA, Behind the Blue Disc, supra note 94.
97. NCAA, CONCUSSION: A FACT SHEET FOR COACHES (2012), available at fs.ncaa.org/Docs/health_
safety/ConFactSheetcoaches.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
98. NCAA, Behind the Blue Disc, supra note 94.
99. Id.
100. See generally CONCUSSION MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, UNIV. GA. ATHLETIC ASS’N (July 2010),
available at http://www.cbsatlanta.com/story/19564028/uga-takes-layered-approach-to-concussions (on file
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NCAA, the lack of uniform concussion management guidelines may
unnecessarily put players’ health at risk, as well as expose some schools to tort
liability if the school’s concussion policy does not meet the standard of care for
101
concussion management.
C. State Concussion Laws
In response to the growing concern about concussions in sports, specifically
in football, the state of Washington passed the nation’s first comprehensive
102
concussion law, named the Zackery Lystedt Law, in 2009. This established a
three-prong law that served as a model for subsequent state concussion laws
across the nation and which generally mirrors the current NFL return-to-play
103
protocol. The three core tenets of the Lystedt Law are:
(1) “[a]thletes, parents and coaches must be educated about the dangers
of concussions each year,” (2) “[i]f a young athlete is suspected of
having a concussion, he/she must be removed from a game or practice
and not be permitted to return to play,” and (3) “[a] licensed health care
professional “trained in the evaluation and management of
104
concussions ” must clear the young athlete to return to play” in
105
writing.
Attempting to influence other states, NFL commissioner Roger Goodell sent
letters to forty-four state governors in 2010 urging them to pass laws similar to
106
the state of Washington. Following Washington’s lead, other states started to
107
adopt concussion legislation.
with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter Georgia Concussion Guidelines].
101. Compare W. Va. Univ. Intercollegiate Athletics, CONCUSSION MANAGEMENT PLAN (2010), with
Winona St. Univ., CONCUSSION MANAGEMENT PLAN (2010); LeTourneau University, CONCUSSION
MANAGEMENT PLAN (2011). Although all three plans address concussions, the discrepancies between the three
plans generally shows the inconsistency among NCAA member university concussion plans at the Division I,
II, and III levels.
102. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.600.190 (West 2012); see also Lystedt Law Overview, NFL,
http://nflhealthandsafety.com/zackery-lystedt-law/lystedt-law-overview/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that Washington named the law after Zackery Lystedt, a middle
school football player who suffered a debilitating brain injury when he returned to a middle school football
game after sustaining an undiagnosed concussion in 2006).
103. Lystedt Law Overview, supra note 102.
104. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.600.190 (West 2012).
105. Id. at § 28A.600.190(4); Lystedt Law Overview, supra note 102.
106. See, e.g., Letter from Roger Goodell, Comm’r, NFL to Christopher J. Christie, Governor, N.J. (May,
21, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (encouraging states to support legislation that would better
protect young athletes by mandating laws that would improve the treatment of concussions); Letter from Roger
Goodell, Comm’r, NFL & Mark Emmert, NCAA, President to Richard D. Snyder, Governor, Mich. (Jan 11,
2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (encouraging states to adopt concussion legislation).
107. Concussion Legislation by State, NFL EVOLUTION, http://www.nflevolution.com/article/Concussion
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As of April 2014, forty-eight states have passed statutes containing the three
tenets of the Lystedt Law, which shows a national trend regarding return-to-play
108
and concussion management standards at the high school and youth levels.
While all current state concussion laws apply to interscholastic athletics, nonschool athletics, like Pop Warner football, usually fall outside of the scope of
109
state laws. Moreover, there is a jurisdictional split between states on whether
110
the statutory provisions explicitly create an independent cause of action.
Generally, statutes either explicitly read that the return-to-play requirements do
not “create, establish, expand, reduce, contract or eliminate any civil liability,” or
111
they are silent and therefore do not create a private right of action. Regardless,
in the forty-eight states with statutory provisions similar to the Lystedt Law, each
of the three prongs of the law are elements of the return-to-play protocol that has
112
become a custom in football.
IV. TORT ACTIONS IN SPORTS
This Part addresses the legal standard in tort actions against public and
private individuals. Section A discusses how assumption of the risk can
-Legislation-by-State?ref=767#CA (last updated Aug. 14, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
108. Id. Six states (Arkansas, Georgia, Montana, South Carolina, and West Virginia) passed concussion
legislation in 2013. Id. Mississippi passed state concussion legislation in January 2014. Id. Furthermore, only
three states that have passed laws do not contain all three tenants of the Lystedt Law. Id. Although Colorado
passed legislation, it does not have the parent and athlete educational component (but does require coaching
education). Id. Illinois passed legislation that delegates concussion laws to the Illinois High School Association,
which has regulations that mirror the Lystedt Law. Id. Wyoming passed legislation that “only requires that the
state Superintendent of Public Institutions develop a model protocol and to assist school districts in developing
protocols for addressing risks associated with concussions from school athletics.” Id. The law does not have the
removal or return to play tenants of the Lystedt Law. Id.
109. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.600.190 (West 2012); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49475 (West
2012) (applying concussion laws to student-athletes only), with 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5323(g) (West 2012)
(“The sponsors of youth athletic activities not specifically addressed by this act are encouraged to follow the
guidance set forth in this act.”). But see D.C. CODE § 7-2871.01 (2011) (“‘Athletic activity’ means a program or
event, including practice and competition, organized as part of a school-sponsored, interscholastic-athletic
program, an athletic program sponsored by the Department of Parks and Recreation, or an athletic program
under the auspices of a nonprofit or for-profit organization.”). The fear of liability for volunteer coaches in club
sports such as Pop Warner may contribute to the fact that not all states incorporate club sports into their returnto-play statutes. See Phoebe Anne Amburg, Protecting Kids’ Melons: Potential Liability and Enforcement
Issues with Youth Concussion Laws, 23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 171, 186 (2012) (asserting that the potential
liability imposed on coaches concerned some state legislators).
110. See Amburg, supra note 109, at 183 (discussing how most statutes generally do not create an
independent cause of action). Conversely, the City of Chicago charges schools a fee if they do not enforce the
city’s concussion management ordinance. Id.
111. Compare 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5323 (West 2012); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 38.159 (West 2011)
(asserting that the statute neither waives immunity nor creates a cause of action), with WASH. REV. CODE §
28A.600.190 (West 2012); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49475 (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 7-2871.01 (2011); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 943.0438 (West 2012). Each of the latter statutes is silent on whether it creates a separate cause of action
for a plaintiff.
112. Infra Part V.A.
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potentially limit liability. Section B addresses the qualified immunity of public
entities, such as schools and universities. Section C outlines the effectiveness of a
comparative negligence argument by a defendant. Section D discusses the role of
custom in negligence lawsuits.
A. Assumption of the Risk in Football
113

Generally, a negligence-based theory of liability is common in sports injury
114
related lawsuits. The initial evaluation of a potential lawsuit involving a
concussion injury requires an evaluation of the potential limits on liability. In
115
sports, assumption of the risk is a complete bar to recovery. There are two
116
types of assumption of the risk: express and implied.
Football players assume the risk of injury due to the physical nature of the
game. In high school football, concussion information sheets that players and
117
parents must sign are an example of express assumption of the risk.
113. See Thomas R. Hurst & James N. Knight, Coaches’ Liability for Athletes’ Injuries and Deaths, 13
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 27, 32 (2003) (“[T]he plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant owed a duty to
conform to a standard of conduct established by law for the protection of the plaintiff, (2) that the defendant
breached that duty; (3) that the defendant’s breach was the legal cause of the plaintiffs injury; and (4) that the
plaintiff suffered compensable injury.”).
114. See Cerny v. Cedar Bluffs Junior/Senior Pub. Sch., 679 N.W.2d 198, 200 (2005) [hereinafter Cerny
II] (alleging negligence against the school and coaching staff for allowing a football player to re-enter a game
after suffering a concussion); Ripple Complaint, supra note 1, at 12 (alleging football coaches’ negligence for
allowing a football player to continue to play after receiving multiple concussions); District Court Order at 2,
Alt v. Shirey, No. 2:llcv468 (W. Dist. Penn. Mar. 1, 2012) (granting in-part and denying in-part a negligence
action against a coach for allowing a concussed football player to participate in a game); Leahy v. Hernando
Cnty., 450 So. 2d 883, 885 (1984) (alleging negligence for injuries sustained by a player competing in a drill
without a helmet against a player with a helmet); Zalkin v. Am. Learning Sys. Inc., 639 So. 2d 1020 (1994)
(alleging negligent supervision for allowing a player to return-to-play following a shoulder injury); Benitez v.
N.Y.C. Bd. Educ., 73 N.Y.2d 650, 654 (1989) (alleging negligence for allowing a player to enter a game when
overly fatigued); Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 995 (2003) (alleging negligence when
a coach failed to teach a swimmer how to properly dive into a pool); Complaint, Arrington v. NCAA, No. 1:11cv-06356 (N. Dist. Ill. E. Div. Sept. 12, 2011) (alleging negligence in implementing return-to-play guidelines);
La Salle Settles Injured Player’s Lawsuit, ESPN (Nov. 30, 2009, 6:55 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/
ncf/news/story?id=4700355 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing how La Salle University
settled for $7.5 million over an alleged injury suffered by a football player that returned-to-play before his brain
fully healed). “The lawsuit hinged on the family’s claim that an earlier concussion made [the player] more
vulnerable to the second, catastrophic blow,” which was suffered after the player previously received a
concussion during a practice earlier that week. Id.
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965) (“A plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk
of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover for such harm.”).
116. Id. at §§ 496A–B.
117. See, e.g., Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, Concussion Information Sheet (May 20, 2010), available at
http://www.cifstate.org/index.php/the-latest-news/concussions (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(illustrating the signs and symptoms of a concussion for athletes participating in sports). Most states require
high school students and parents to sign concussion information sheets including (but not limited to) California,
Texas, Florida, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, and Ohio. While California’s concussion information sheet discusses
one potential injury for an athlete, Oklahoma and other states have a more explicit and broad assumption of the
risk waivers. See Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass’n, Physical Examination and Parental Consent Form
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Additionally, implied assumption of the risk states that a defendant does not owe
a plaintiff a duty of care for an injury that occurred from an inherent risk of a
118
sport. In the football context, a coach is not liable for injuries that a player
sustains from an initial concussion because contact is an inherent part of the
119
game.
However, coaches do have a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect
120
players from “unreasonably increased risks.” Coaches will only incur liability
for acting intentionally or recklessly in a manner that is “totally outside the range
121
of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.” However, coaches do have a
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect players from “unreasonably increased
122
risks.” In Cerny II, coaches who allowed a concussed football player to re-enter
a game could not use assumption of the risk as a bar to the player’s negligence
123
suit. Therefore, it follows that a school or its agents (coaches, trainers, or team
doctors) owe a duty to not let a concussed player re-enter a game because doing
124
so would increase the player’s risk of aggravation or injury. Such behavior
would constitute reckless behavior, preventing a defendant from establishing the
125
defense at trial. In addition to the assumption of the risk defense, plaintiffs must
126
also deal with traditional principles of sovereign immunity.

(2013), available at http://ossaa.com/MiscForms.aspx (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“I understand
the risk of injury in athletic participation.”). Note: the state of Florida requires high school football players to
sign a waiver and release of liability form that bars suit against schools “us[ing] reasonable care in providing
[sports] activities.” Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Consent and Release from Liability Certificate (May 2012).
A coach allowing a player to enter a game after sustaining a concussion and showing the signs and symptoms of
a concussion does not fall within this waiver. See infra notes 120–22 (discussing a coach’s duty not to increase
the inherent risks of sports).
118. Knight v. Jewitt, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 316 (1992).
119. Id.; see also Fortier v. Los Rios Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. App. 4th 430, 432–33 (1996) (holding that
accidental contact during a “seven-on-seven” drill was an inherent risk of football).
120. Benitez v. N.Y.C. Bd. Educ., 73 N.Y.2d 650, 654 (1989).
121. See Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 996 (2003) (asserting that a coach’s
failure to instruct a novice swimmer to dive, combined with manipulative and coercive behavior leading to the
injury of the swimmer, was outside the “ordinary activity” of coaching).
122. Benitez v. N.Y.C. Bd. Educ., 73 N.Y.2d 650, 654 (1989); Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31
Cal. 4th 990 at 1005.
123. See generally Cerny II, 679 N.W.2d 198 (2004) (evaluating only whether the coaches failed to meet
the standard of care).
124. See Cerny v. Cedar Bluffs Junior/Senior Pub. Sch., 628 N.W.2d 697, 705 (2001) [hereinafter Cerny
I] (stating it was “clear that the School and the coaches it employed owed a duty,” to a football player that
suffered a concussion in a game). Given that concussion litigation is a fairly recent trend and the striking
majority of concussion cases end in settlement, Cerny I represents one of the only written decisions specifically
outlining a duty for schools and its agents to students playing football. Id. However, other case law supports an
analogous duty for schools and coaches to protect students from unreasonably increasing the risk of the sport,
which allowing a concussed player to re-enter a game falls within. Supra notes 120–22.
125. Id.
126. Infra Part IV.B.
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B. Governmental Immunity for Public Schools
Generally, public schools are immune from tort action in the event of injury
127
or death, with a few exceptions. The exceptions are “constitutional or
legislative provision[s]” applying liability or if a school’s conduct is willful or
128
wanton. Schools cannot bar suit regardless of whether its willful or wanton
129
conduct was active or passive. When applying this doctrine to concussion
management, in the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions, the fact that
130
so much information is readily available regarding the subject means that
131
schools are on notice that certain practices may be inherently dangerous.
Therefore, a plaintiff would have a strong argument that governmental immunity
would not apply because the school’s actions (convincing a player to stay in the
game) or lack of action (failing to remove a player who exhibited symptoms of a
132
concussion) demonstrated a conscious disregard for the safety of the student.
This would allow the plaintiff to move forward in his tort action, and ordinary
133
negligence principles would apply. Following the logic in Villardo, Gerrity,
and Cerny II, if a coach allowed a player who demonstrated the signs and
symptoms of a concussion to re-enter a game, and that player suffered further

127. Allan E. Korpela, Modern Status of Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity as Applied to Public Schools
and Institutions of Higher Learning, A.L.R. 3d 703, § 2a (1970). Most states waive a sovereign immunity
defense when a claim arises out of gross negligence or reckless behavior of the educator. John B. Roesler,
Public School Liability: Constitutional Tort Claims for Excessive Punishment and Failure to Supervise
Students, 48 AM. JUR. TRIALS 587 at § 8 (2013). Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, if a school purchases
insurance that covers the claimed injury, it effectively waives immunity. See, e.g., Herweg v. Bd. Educ. Lawton
Pub. Sch., 673 P.2d 154, 157 (1983) (“[W]henever a school district does have public liability insurance for the
harm that is sought to be vindicated, its immunity is waived ‘to the extent of the . . . coverage only.’”). Note:
private schools or leagues outside of school or interscholastic competition cannot use the defense of
governmental immunity. Jaar v. Univ. Miami, 474 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1985).
128. Korpela, supra note 127. For example, in Arkansas, “state employees are not immune from suit for
negligence, to the extent the employees are covered by other viable liability insurance.” Deitsch v. Tillery, 309
Ark. 401, 409 (2000).
129. See Jackson v. Hankinson, 51 N.J. 230 (1968) (“[T]here has been a shift towards frank recognition
that municipal entities, along with all others, should justly be held accountable for injuries resulting from their
tortious acts and omissions under ordinary principles of negligence . . . .”).
130. See, e.g., NFHS LEARNING CENTER, http://nfhslearn.com/electiveDetail.aspx?courseID=15000 (last
visited Mar. 1, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (offering free concussion education). Generally,
state athletic governing bodies and the NCAA link to free concussion training through either the CDC or NFHS.
Concussions, CIF, http://www.cifstate.org/index.php/the-latest-news/concussions (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review). The CIF website links to both CDC and NFHS. Id.
131. Korpela, supra note 127.
132. See Vilardo v. Barrington Cmty. Sch. Dist, 406 Ill. App. 3d 713, 720 (2010) (asserting that a school
is immune from liability unless the school has “actual or constructive notice of the existence of such a condition
that is not reasonably safe in reasonably adequate time prior to an injury to have taken measures to remedy or
protect against such condition”).
133. See Gerrity v. Beatty, 71 Ill. 2d 47, 52 (1978) (holding that public policy combined with willful and
wanton acts by a school in failing to provide a proper football helmet to a student subjected the school to an
ordinary negligence suit).
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injury, governmental immunity would not apply.
135
must address is comparative fault.

One final argument plaintiffs

C. Comparative Fault
In a negligence case, a defendant can use the defense of comparative fault to
lower the amount of a plaintiff’s recoverable damages. There are two types of
136
comparative fault, “pure form” and “equal to or greater than.” The former
137
assigns liability in direct proportion to the fault of both parties. The latter
assigns proportional liability only if the defendant’s liability is equal to or greater
138
than the plaintiff’s. In each system of comparative fault, defendants “are
responsible for their acts to the extent their fault contributes,” to a plaintiff’s
139
injury.
In the context of football, this argument has mixed results. If a coach saw a
player exhibiting any signs and symptoms of a concussion, even if a player says
“I’m OK,” a coach could not use comparative fault as a defense because returnto-play laws require removal if a coach objectively sees any symptoms of a
140
concussion, regardless of what a player may say. On the other hand, in the
141
context of “contact” practices, a coach who had two contact practices in one
day may be able to use a comparative fault defense if a player suffered an injury
by knowingly tackling another player in an unsafe manner after receiving proper
142
instruction by a coach. If a player can get past the legal hurdles of assumption
of the risk, government immunity, and comparative negligence, he may be able
143
to succeed in a negligence suit in court.
D. The Role of Custom in Negligence Suits
In a negligence suit, individuals breach the standard of care if they do not
144
exercise reasonable care. In a negligence case, an individual acts unreasonably

134. 406 Ill. App. 3d at 720; 71 Ill. 2d at 52; 679 N.W.2d at 198.
135. Infra Part IV.C.
136. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 827 (1975).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 828.
140. See generally supra Part III.C (explaining the prongs of return-to-play laws).
141. Infra Part V.E.
142. See Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 310 (1992) (“[T]he injury in such a case may have been caused
by the combined effect of the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s culpable conduct.”).
143. Infra Part IV.D.
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 (2010). Note: while
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A (1965) also covers custom, the updated version is used here because
of the added commentary, which goes into further detail regarding custom than the previous Restatement. Note:
This Article assumes that the other elements of negligence are satisfied. Duty would arise from the school’s or
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if the burden to prevent the injury is less than the probability of injury multiplied
145
by the gravity of the injury (B < PL). Although some jurisdictions differ,
generally coaches in college, high school, and youth football have the “duty to
146
exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable risks of harm,” to their players.
An individual’s compliance with a custom is generally strong evidence that
that individual is acting reasonably, if relying on the custom decreases the risk of
147
injury. Practices that “virtually all those participating in an activity,” adopt are
148
widespread customs. In many cases, widespread customs have become the
standard of care because the custom “induces general reliance by virtually all
149
those participating in an activity,” and it is the most reasonable practice.
150
Industry customs that leading experts in a certain field agree are the most
reasonable practices also give strong indications that the custom directly informs
151
the standard of care.
Since 1923, lower levels of football have tended to adopt advancements in
152
safety that the NFL has taken in order to make football safer. In terms of
concussion prevention, management, and treatment, the practices currently used
by the NFL are all byproducts of collaborations by the league with various
independent experts in the fields of science, medicine, athletic training,
bioengineering, and equipment manufacturing, which gives a strong indication
that the customs established by the NFL should directly inform the standard of
153
care. The NFL concussion management custom most widely adopted by the
154
lower levels of football is removal and return-to-play. However, individual
states and the NCAA can do more to improve all of their concussion
155
management policies.

coach’s duty to protect players. Causation would be satisfied because the breach would be a substantial factor in
the injury. Finally, the likelihood of injury in a football game would be sufficiently related to demonstrate
proximate cause, and damages could be established because of the clear physical injury.
145. See U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (1947) (describing Learned Hand’s B<PL
formula).
146. See Hurst & Knight, supra note 113, at 32–33 (discussing duty relating to a sports injury as a part of
negligence personal injury liability).
147. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 (2010) (stating that
conforming to a custom does not preclude a finding of negligence nor does non-adherence to a custom
guarantee a finding of negligence).
148. Id. at § 13 cmt. e (2010).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See supra Part II.C (illustrating the initial adoption of safer equipment and rule changes).
153. NFL HEALTH & SAFETY REPORT, supra note 88, at 27–29.
154. Infra Part V.B.
155. Infra Part V.
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V. NFL CUSTOMS THAT COLLEGE, HIGH SCHOOL, AND YOUTH FOOTBALL
SHOULD ADOPT
This Part argues that the lower levels of football should adopt the various
concussion management customs currently in place in the NFL. It further argues
that the NFL’s current actions to address concussions either informs or is the
most reasonable standard of care for different areas of concussion management.
Each Section of this Part will analyze a custom, assert its bearing on the standard
of care, and suggest how to implement the custom at the college, high school, or
youth level. Section A discusses return-to-play protocols. Section B argues how
education should supplement concussion laws and policies. Section C discusses
baseline testing. Section D discusses the elimination of two-a-day practices.
A. Removal from Play and Return-to-Play
1. Informing the Standard of Care in High School and Youth Football
There are only ten states that have not adopted the model legislation
156
supported by the NFL. The Lystedt Law and its progeny essentially mirror the
157
current NFL removal and return-to-play policy in all aspects. However, most
state concussion laws do not apply to every area of football, namely private
158
schools or non-school football leagues like Pop Warner. Of all the concussion
management customs that the NFL has promulgated, its return-to-play policy is
the strongest candidate for adoption by states into their statutes because it is
already the most widely adopted. Such an adoption would directly inform the
standard of care for concussion management regardless of whether the entity is
public or private.
Concussions are an inherent part of the game of football, but allowing a
player to return-to-play after demonstrating the signs and symptoms of a
159
concussion unnecessarily increases the risk of injury. Although a plaintiff could
160
likely not sue under negligence per se, a plaintiff could argue that because the
NFL return-to-play policy is both the industry custom based on expert
knowledge, and a widespread custom that all players participating in sports rely
on, non-adherence to the custom should constitute a breach of the standard of
161
162
care. Because almost all concussion lawsuits have settled before trial, there is

156. Infra Part III.
157. Infra Part III.
158. Infra Part IV.D.
159. Benitez v. N.Y.C. Bd. Educ., 73 N.Y.2d 650, 654 (1989); Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31
Cal. 4th 990, 1005 (2003).
160. See supra text accompanying note 111 (asserting that the various state concussion statutes either do
not create a private right of action or are silent).
161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 (2010).
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a lack of case law discussing the standard of care. If more concussion cases start
making it to trial, a custom mirrored in nearly every state statute governing
concussion management will be highly relevant, although not dispositive, and
may lead courts to adopt the NFL return-to-play policy as the standard of care. If
a player, injured in a state that does not have a concussion law or does not fall
within the scope of the state’s concussion statute, brought a suit under the same
163
facts as the Zachary Lystedt case, the player could point to the NFL’s policy as
164
well as the laws of forty-eight other states as being the most reasonable way to
165
manage concussions.
Additionally, states that do not have statutory guidelines unnecessarily
expose youth players to greater risk of returning-to-play before they fully heal
because it is less clear to coaches and schools what the most generally accepted
166
form of concussion management is. There is also preliminary evidence from
states with concussion laws in place that both emergency room visits due to
sports related head trauma and personal injury lawsuits are down, while
167
concussion reporting is on the rise.
These facts further lead to the conclusion that the NFL return-to-play policy
is the most reasonable action for coaches and schools to take regarding
concussion management. And if faced with a negligence lawsuit, a court would
likely view the NFL’s return-to-play policy as highly relevant to determining the
168
standard of care. The most effective way to implement these laws is to amend
current state concussion laws to encompass all football from youth to high
school, including private schools. Amending state laws to be more inclusive
gives more teeth to current regulations in place by non-school leagues or state
athletic governing bodies, which also informs the standard of care. A potential
hurdle to making existing state concussion laws more inclusive is the potential of
“chilling” participation by volunteer coaches because of fear of litigation.
However, non-school football leagues like Pop Warner already implement
169
similar return-to-play guidelines. Additionally, most state high school athletic
162. See supra note 125 (discussing that only one case has established a standard of care for concussion
management).
163. Lystedt was a middle school football player who suffered a debilitating brain injury when he
returned-to-play in a football game after sustaining an undiagnosed concussion in 2006. His story and
subsequent lawsuit spurred the national movement for states passing concussion laws. See Lystedt Law
Overview, supra note 102.
164. Concussion Legislation by State, supra note 107.
165. In the instance that the player-plaintiff did not fall within the scope of a state statute, the plaintiff
could argue that either the statute should apply to him or (if the statute does not create a cause of action) that the
three prongs of the statute represent the standard of care applicable to all defendants.
166. Richard H. Adler et al., Changing the Culture of Concussion: Education Meets Legislation, 3 AM.
ACAD. PHYSICAL MED. & REHAB. S469 (2011) [hereinafter Education Meets Legislation] (asserting that in
order to have a uniform concussion policy there must be both concussion education and legislation).
167. Id. at S470.
168. See infra Part IV.D (discussing custom’s role in a negligence suit).
169. Pop Warner Concussion Policy, POP WARNER (2013), http://www.popwarner.com/safety/
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governing bodies have their own return-to-play protocols for member schools
170
that mirror state law. Since private school members are subject to the bylaws of
the governing body, amending state laws would not unduly burden private
schools or force them to change their concussion management policies and would
be the most effective action for states to take in order to reduce return-to-play
injuries.
2. Enforcing Uniformity in College Football: Matt Scott Case Study
The University of Arizona has its own return-to-play rule because the NCAA
171
delegates its concussion management policies to the individual institutions. On
October 27, 2012, Arizona hosted the then ninth-ranked team in the country, the
University of Southern California (USC), in what was Arizona’s biggest game of
172
the season. While sliding at the end of a running play, two USC defenders hit
173
quarterback Matt Scott in succession in the back and then the front of his head.
Scott was slow getting up, immediately grabbed his head, threw-up moments
174
later, and appeared somewhat disoriented. Arizona called a timeout where Scott
and his teammates talked to coaches while the team’s athletic trainers passively
175
observed the conversation. Both television announcers during the broadcast
176
recognized that Scott exhibited the signs and symptoms of a concussion. After
the timeout, Scott remained in the game and, three plays later, threw a touchdown
177
pass that sealed an upset win for Arizona. Coaches pulled Scott from the game
after the touchdown, he vomited again on the sidelines, and a team doctor finally
178
administered a sideline test. Scott did not re-enter the game.
If Scott had suffered an aggravating injury after returning to play and sued
the University of Arizona for negligence, the University’s current return-to-play

concussionpolicy.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
170. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 38.152 (West 2011) (applying the state statute to University
Interscholastic League, the state’s high school athletics governing body). The Texas concussion statute provides
a model for expanding high school return-to-play protocols to private high schools. Id.; see also CAL.
INTERSCHOLASTIC FED’N CONST., BYLAWS, & STATE CHAMPIONSHIP REGULATIONS 2011–2012 (2011) art. 30
§ 313, available at http://205.214.168.16/governance/constitution_bylaws/pdf/CIF%20CONSC%20BYLAW
%20BOOK%201011.pdf. (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (applying the concussion bylaws to all
member schools).
171. Infra Part III.B.
172. Dan Diamond, Arizona Just Broke the NCAA’s Concussion Policy. Will it Matter?, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2012,
9:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dandiamond/2012/10/27/arizona-just-broke-the-ncaas-concussion-policy-willit-matter/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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179

policy suggests that he would have had a strong case. The first prong of the
policy is to remove a player immediately if he is demonstrating any “physical . . .
180
cognitive . . . emotional . . . [or] sleep” symptoms of a concussion. Scott
objectively appeared “dazed or stunned” and vomited, which are clear
181
concussion symptoms. The second prong is to evaluate the player immediately
182
by trained medical professionals, such as team trainers or the team doctor. This
did not occur, as Arizona only called a timeout and had a trainer watch Scott’s
183
interactions with the coaching staff. At that point, coaches or team medical
184
personnel should not have allowed Scott to re-enter the game. By allowing
Scott to remain in the game, Arizona did not adhere to the industry custom and
most reasonable practices established by the NFL, which are mirrored by the
185
university, NCAA, and most state laws. Another telling sign that Arizona
breached the standard of care is that immediately after Scott led the team to the
game-winning score, he received a proper sideline evaluation from a medical
186
staff member and did not return to the game.
Luckily for all involved, Scott did not suffer an injury after returning to play
187
during the three plays in which he remained in the game. Both the University of
188
Arizona and Scott denied that he suffered a concussion. However, universities
should use this as an example of how not to execute concussion management
because it exposes them to negligence liability. The fact remains that Scott did
exhibit the signs of a concussion, and the school did not remove him from play
immediately, conduct a sideline evaluation, or wait to return him to play until
189
after approval from a medical professional.

179. Compare Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI)/Concussion Guidelines, Univ. Ariz. (2010)
[hereinafter Arizona Concussion Guidelines], with NCAA, CONCUSSION: A FACT SHEET FOR COACHES, supra
note 97 (illustrating that the University of Arizona’s return-to-play guidelines generally mirror the NCAA’s
recommended return-to-play guidelines).
180. Arizona Concussion Guidelines, supra note 181.
181. Id.
182. Id. Since the University of Arizona did not meet the second prong of its return-to-play policy, it is
not necessary to evaluate the final two prongs. Id.
183. Diamond, supra note 174.
184. See supra note 113 (discussing the elements of negligence). Even under the lowered return-to-play
standard in Cerny II (which the current Nebraska concussion statute raised), the University would have violated
the standard of care. Cerny v. Cedar Bluffs Jr./Sr. Pub. Sch., 679 N.W.2d 198, 203 (2005)(“[T]the coach must
evaluate the player who appears to have suffered a head injury for the symptoms of a concussion.”).
185. NFL Memo, supra note 86; NCAA, CONCUSSION: A FACT SHEET FOR COACHES, supra note 97;
Lystedt Law Overview, supra note 102.
186. Diamond, supra note 174.
187. Id.
188. See id. (“As of Tuesday noon ET, they still refuse to confirm or deny that Scott had a concussion test
and whether he passed or failed it.”).
189. NFL Memo, supra note 86; NCAA, CONCUSSION: A FACT SHEET FOR COACHES, supra note 97;
Lystedt Law Overview, supra note 102; Arizona Concussion Guidelines, supra note 181.
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Some Division I programs, like Arizona, have the large budget to adopt the
exact NFL protocol of the doctor sideline examination. In those cases, the
program should mirror the NFL return-to-play policy because it is the most
comprehensive. At a minimum, to insure player safety and avoid litigation, all
NCAA Division I–III member institutions should implement return-to-play
policies that mirror the suggested NCAA policy, which the NCAA derived
190
fundamentally from the NFL’s return-to-play policy. Furthermore, the NCAA
should mandate member universities to adopt the return-to-play it currently
suggests. This represents the baseline reasonable standard of care because it is an
191
industry custom supported by medical experts, which all levels of football from
192
the NFL to Pop Warner have adopted.
B. Education Supplements Laws and Boosts Awareness
In order for coaches to more effectively implement return-to-play rules and
prevent long-term injuries from repeated concussions, education must
193
supplement legislation. Many states, such as California and Texas, require
coaches to receive training on the signs and symptoms of and appropriate
194
responses to concussions.
States should supplement their concussion laws to add mandatory concussion
training for youth and high school football coaches. Coaches can receive free
online training through the National Federation of High School Associations
(NHFS) or Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) websites, which
195
would enable states to pass legislation with no financial burden. At the
collegiate level, NCAA member universities should add mandatory concussion
training for coaches into their university’s concussion management policy. This
will equip coaches with training that will help them make effective on-field
decisions to remove players from games or practices and could potentially limit
liability for schools that do not have enough money in their athletic budget to hire
196
a sideline doctor. Some may argue that mandating education for coaches will

190. NFL Press Release, supra note 84; NFL Memo, supra note 86.
191. Supra Part IV.C.
192. Supra Part III.A.1–2, V.B.1.
193. Education Meets Legislation, supra note 168, at S469.
194. See generally, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35179.1 (West 2012); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 38.159 (West
2011).
195. Coaches Concussion Resources, CAL. INTERSCHOLASTIC FED’N (2012), http://205.214.168.16/
health_safety/concussion/ coaches.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (offering links to concussion
information, including free concussion training).
196. See Josh Hunsucker, “When In Doubt, Sit Them Out”: Chapter 173 Effectively Supplements
California Concussion Law and Raises Awareness Among Coaches, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 600, 606 (2013)
(asserting that uniform concussion guidelines will also reduce concussion litigation and the number of injuries
resulting from athletes returning to play before they are fully healed).
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197

increase the standard of care. However, mandating education on concussions
does not give coaches medical training, it merely clarifies what a reasonable
198
coach should know about concussions. This education would not only clarify
the standard of care for return-to-play, but would also help coaches enforce
199
return-to-play laws and policies.
C. Baseline Testing Becomes the Standard of Care
Computerized baseline and post-injury neurocognitive tests have become a
200
mandatory part of the preseason physical in the NFL. Other professional sports
201
leagues such as the Canadian Football League, Major League Baseball, the
National Hockey League, the National Basketball Association, and Major League
202
203
Soccer use baseline testing. In California alone, fifty-nine universities and
204
205
168 high schools use ImPACT, which is the “most-widely used and most
206
scientifically validated computerized concussion evaluation system.”
A
computerized baseline test generally consists of a twenty-minute battery of tests
207
that measure neurocognitive function. If a player takes a test before the season
and then suffers a concussion, the baseline test serves as a data point to evaluate a
concussed player’s post-injury condition and track recovery for safe return to
208
play, thus preventing the cumulative effects of concussion.”

197. See Cerny v. Cedar Bluffs Pub. Sch., 628 N.W.2d 697, 702 (2001) (holding that a reasonable
coach’s base of knowledge extends only to “the requisite first aid training required by the State as part of a
college level course dealing with the prevention of athletic injuries”). When an “alleged tort-feasor possesses
special knowledge . . . training, or experience . . . that is superior to that of the ordinary person. Such a person is
not held to the standard of a reasonably prudent person,” but to a heightened standard of care. Id.
198. Hunsucker, supra note 196, at 606.
199. See Cerny v. Cedar Bluffs Pub. Sch., 679 N.W.2d 198, 203 (2004) (discussing the first prong of the
Nebraska common law standard of care for concussion management).
200. NFL CBA, supra note 63, at Appendix K Standard Minimum Preseason Physical Examination
(2011).
201. Concussion Card, CFL, http://www.cfl.ca/page/concussion-card (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
202. Complete List of ImPACT Users, IMPACT (2013), http://impacttest.com/clients/page/all (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. About ImPACT, IMPACT, http://impacttest.com/about/ (2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); ImPACT, http://impacttest.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2014) [hereinafter Overview and Features of the
ImPACT Test] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
206. Id. This Comment recognizes that there are various, valid computerized neurocognitive baseline
testing models, including but not limited to, iBaseline, Pass Mark, and Axon. This Comment specifically uses
ImPACT because it discloses their clients, which allows for an analysis of the degree of adoption of the custom
of computerized baseline testing. See supra note 205. In using the numbers from ImPACT alone, I recognize
any argument about widespread use will assert inherently understated figures.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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The well-defined policy established by the NFL, which universities and high
209
schools have widely adopted across the country, is an emerging custom that
210
directly should inform the standard of care. If a student attending a high school
sued the school alleging negligence in ensuring the students’ safety, the student
could make an argument that by not adhering to the baseline testing custom, the
211
school acted unreasonably.
The following are two arguments that a plaintiff could make if he sued a high
212
school under a negligence theory for improper concussion management.
1. Widespread Custom and Industry Custom
The first argument based on widespread custom may be difficult for plaintiffs
to make currently but will likely be a stronger argument as science and medicine
advance. Regardless of the widespread nature of the custom, a plaintiff will
always prevail even if an emerging custom is not widespread but is the most
213
reasonable standard of care.
A plaintiff could argue that because so many professional sports, universities,
214
and high schools across America conduct computerized baseline testing that all
players participating in sports are reliant on baseline testing to ensure proper
215
concussion management. The problem with this argument is that because
baseline testing is fairly new, it is probably not widespread enough to induce
216
reliance.
A second argument is that since the NFL and other professional football
leagues mandate baseline testing as an industry custom, which medical experts
217
agree is an important part of concussion management, there is a strong
209. For the purpose of this Article, an emerging custom is a practice that is new, and while becoming
more widely accepted, does not currently meet the legal criteria for a widespread custom.
210. Complete List of ImPACT Users, supra note 202.
211. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 (2010).
212. Infra Part V.D.1–2. Note that the use of California schools does not change the analysis and another
state could be substituted for any other state without changing the substantive effect of the argument.
213. See T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Co., 60 F.2d 737 (1932) (holding that carrying radios on tugboats was
the most reasonable practice even though it was not a general custom).
214. See Complete List of ImPACT Users, supra note 202 (listing all of the ImPACT users by state).
215. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 (2010).
216. Telephone interview with Dr. Michael Collins, Dir., UPMC Sports Med. Concussion Program (June
6, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter Collins Interview]. Dr. Collins asserted that the
future goals of concussion management at the high school level are baseline testing becoming part of the
standard of care, coaches increasing their awareness of concussions through regional concussion seminars, and
ensuring injured athletes receive treatment from clinicians specializing in concussion management. Id.
“[N]eurocognitive testing has been called the ‘cornerstone’ of proper concussion management by an
international panel of sports medicine experts.” Overview and Features of the ImPACT Test, supra note 205.
217. See Baseline Testing for Concussion, SPORTS CONCUSSION INSTIT., http://www.Concussion
treatment.com/baseline-testing.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(asserting that baseline testing provides important post-injury comparative data and enables doctors to better
treat and rehabilitate a patient).
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218

indication that it highly relevant to informing the standard of care. Combining
the widespread custom and industry custom arguments could show that the
219
industry’s emerging custom will likely induce greater reliance in the future.
220
However, because of the emerging nature of the custom and the emerging
nature of the science, a court may not find baseline testing to be the most
reasonable practice based on these two arguments.
2. Application of the Learned Hand B < PL Formula
If the first two arguments failed, the plaintiff could rely on T.J. Hooper v. N.
221
Barge Co. In T.J. Hooper, two tugboats sank in the Atlantic Ocean and the
parties whose cargo sunk sued the tug boat owner alleging negligence because
222
the boats did not carry radios. The court ruled that even though carrying radios
223
on tugboats was not a general custom, it was the most reasonable practice.
Similar to T.J. Hooper, a defendant school could argue that it was not negligent
for failing to administer a baseline test because even though there are 168 schools
that conduct baseline tests, there are not enough schools using baseline testing to
224
make it a well-established custom. However, even if baseline testing is only an
emerging custom, if it is the most reasonable practice, then it informs the
225
standard of care.
In applying B<PL, a jury could likely find that schools that did not
administer a baseline test “unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available
226
devices.” A jury would likely determine that the probability and likelihood of
serious injury from football is fairly high given the inherent physicality of the
227
sport. The jury would then look at the burden of baseline testing on the
228
school.
The biggest issue with computerized neurocognitive baseline testing would
be the feasibility of expecting schools to afford the test. ImPACT costs between

218. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 (2010).
219. Id. at § 13 cmt. d
220. The NFL first mandated baseline testing in its CBA in 2011. NFL CBA, supra note 63, at Appendix
K Standard Minimum Preseason Physical Examination (2011).
221. 60 F.2d 737 (1932).
222. 60 F.2d at 739.
223. Id. at 740. An individual acts unreasonably if the burden to prevent the injury is less than the
probability of injury multiplied by the gravity of the injury. U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173
(1947).
224. T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 739.
225. See id. (“[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its
measure.”).
226. Id.
227. U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (1947).
228. Id.
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$400–$1200 for a school to purchase. Depending on the school budget at the
time of the incident, the financial burden could be less than the magnitude and
probability of severe harm. Conversely, given the economic situation of a
particular state and shrinking school budgets, costs that seem relatively small
230
may actually be too burdensome. In determining whether the financial burden
of computerized baseline testing would outweigh the likelihood of harm, juries
231
would have to undertake a fact-based analysis in each case.
Additionally, plaintiffs could argue that the school could give lower-cost
232
233
neurocognitive testing such as the SCAT2 or King-Devick Test, two widely
used tests that indicate symptoms of concussions. The King-Devick tests
“oculomotor inefficiencies” through a series of “visual tracking and saccadic eye
234
movements.” Similarly, the SCAT2 test indicates concussions through a battery
235
of orientation, concentration, and memory tests. While both tests are helpful
sideline tools that help indicate concussions immediately after an injury, they are
not effective office-based baseline tests because they “general[ly] lack . . .
236
sensitivity,” in their measurements compared to computerized baseline tests.
237
The SCAT2 test is available for free online on the NFL Evolution website, and
the King-Devick Test website offers a hard-copy test and fifty score sheets for
238
$50.00 or iPad application for $44.99. If the defendant argued the burden of
purchasing a $350 ImPACT package for the school was too high, the plaintiff
229. Purchase ImPACT, IMPACT, http://impacttest.com/purchase/form (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review). The packages offer “100 Baseline with 15 Post Injury Tests [for] $400
per School Organization per Year . . . 300 Baseline with 60 Post Injury Tests [for] $600 per School
Organization per Year . . . 500 Baseline with 100 Post Injury Tests [for] $800 per School Organization per
Year . . . 800 Baseline with 150 Post Injury Tests [for] $1200 per School Organization per Year.” Id.
230. See, e.g., Lyndsey Layton, In Trimming School Budgets, More Officials Turn to a Four-Day Week,
WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-10-28/local/35279654_1_schooldistricts-school-week-students (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing how school budget cuts
have forced 292 school districts nationwide to adopt four-day weeks among other significant budget cuts).
231. See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173 (determining negligence by balancing the facts of the case
using the B<PL formula).
232. NFL SIDELINE CONCUSSION ASSESSMENT TOOL (2012), available at www.nflevolution.com/. . ./nflconcussion-tool-post-injury.pdf. (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
233. About King-Devick Test, KING-DEVICK TEST, (http://kingdevicktest.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 19,
2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
234. Id.
235. NFL SIDELINE CONCUSSION ASSESSMENT TOOL (2012), available at www.nflevolution.com/. . ./nflconcussion-tool-post-injury.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
236. Email from Dr. Michael Collins, Dir., UPMC Sports Med. Concussion Program to Author (Mar. 7,
2013, 11:11 AM) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter Collins Email] (“[T]he tests have not
been shown to pick up deficits beyond the very acute stages of injury. I would certainly endorse baseline testing
with these tests-but for sideline not office based use.”).
237. NFL SIDELINE CONCUSSION ASSESSMENT TOOL, supra note 232.
238. Find the King-Devick Test That Is Right for You, KING-DEVICK TEst, http://kingdevicktest.com/forconcussions/purchase/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); King-Devick
Concussion Screening Test Kit, KING-DEVICK TEst, http://kingdevicktest.com/for-concussions/features/ (last
visited Feb. 19, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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may counter that using either the King-Devick or SCAT2 would have a
significantly lower burden. Using either of those tests without supplementing it
with a computerized neurocognitive baseline test is a less effective means of
239
managing a player’s concussion and subsequent treatment. However, using
either of those tests is more effective than not using any type of lower cost
neurocognitive testing. On balance, it would be a close call whether a jury would
rule that the failure to use computerized baseline testing at the youth or high
240
school level would breach the standard of care for concussion management.
Regardless, youth and high school football should strongly consider
neurocognitive baseline testing as a regular part of a player’s preseason physical.
Specifically, schools with the financial means should strongly consider using a
241
computerized baseline testing program. The cost of litigation or a damages
award against a coach or school would almost certainly outweigh the costs of
242
purchasing a computerized baseline testing program. Furthermore, state athletic
governing bodies should encourage high schools to use computerized baseline
testing. While state legislatures may be hesitant to create a statutory requirement
of computerized baseline testing due to the inherent costs schools and leagues
243
would incur, governing bodies can effectively amend their bylaws to encourage
244
the practice. And as computerized baseline testing becomes more affordable, it
may become feasible for states to mandate that type of requirement.
Similarly, universities should implement, at a minimum, a computerized
neurocognitive baseline test prior to a player participating. The NCAA already
245
recommends computerized baseline testing, which may indicate that the
member schools are currently in a better financial position to adopt that model of
246
testing than their youth and high school counterparts. The most logical
inference is that all Division I programs currently have enough money in their

239. Collins Email, supra note 238.
240. Supra Part V.D.2.
241. See Supra Part V.D.2 (asserting that the financial burden would be the key fact in determining
liability).
242. Compare San Diego-Area School District to Pay $4.4 Million for Football Head Injury, NBC NEWS
(Mar. 10, 2012, 2:17 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/03/10/10635259-san-diego-area-schooldistrict-to-pay-44-million-for-football-head-injury?lite (on file with the McGeorge Law Review), and Hackney
Publications, California School District Settles Lawsuit Brought by Former Football Player Who Suffered
Concussion, CONCUSSION POL’Y & THE LAW (Aug. 8, 2012), http://concussionpolicyandthelaw.com/
2012/08/08/california-school-district-settles-lawsuit-brought-by-former-football-player-who-sufferedconcussion/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the reported $40,000 settlement between a
former high school football player and the East Nicolaus High School District), with Purchase ImPACT, supra
note 231.
243. Purchase ImPACT, supra note 231.
244. See Collins Interview, supra note 218 (discussing the goal of spreading ImPACT to all high
schools).
245. NCAA, CONCUSSION: A FACT SHEET FOR COACHES, supra note 97.
246. See supra Part V.D.2 (asserting that the financial burden would be the key fact in determining
liability).
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budget to afford computerized baseline tests given the millions of dollars in
247
revenue generated from football. Since member universities must give financial
statements to the NCAA, the NCAA could mandate member universities with a
minimum net revenue in their athletic departments to institute computerized
248
baseline testing for all of their players. Therefore, the NCAA should mandate
249
computerized baseline testing immediately for its member schools that have
football teams and the budget to afford the testing. For schools that cannot
currently afford the testing, the NCCA should mandate a plan to implement that
practice into the university’s budget within a reasonable time based on projected
revenue gains.
D. Less Contact = Less Injuries = Less Litigation
250

The NFL no longer allows two-a-day practices during training camp. Some
states currently implement rules that preclude padded practice during the first
251
week of summer training camp. The current practice in place in the NFL CBA
of precluding two-a-day practices is a policy that should concern youth, high
school, and university administrators and coaches.
252
If an injured player brings a negligence suit against a school or university,
the player could claim that the two-a-day practice in which he sustained an injury
was not reasonable. To inform the standard of care, he would point to the NFL
practice policies adopted in the CBA. It is logical to assert that practice is more
necessary for NFL players than high school or college players because it is their
profession. The plaintiff’s argument would follow that the industry leader in
football (the NFL) found it dangerous enough to player health that both
253
management and the union agreed to eliminate that part of the game.
Furthermore, the medical community has acknowledged that the developing
brain of a youth or college player is more susceptible to injury or aggravation
247. See College Athletics Revenues and Expenses–2008, ESPN (last visited Apr. 12, 2013), http://espn.
go.com/ncaa/revenue (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (detailing university financial disclosures to the
NCAA).
248. Note: One additional consideration is that member institutions would have to make baseline testing
available in equal proportions to their male and female athletes in order to comply with Title IX. 20 U.S.C. §§
1681–88 (West 2013).
249. Georgia Concussion Guidelines, supra note 100. The NCAA described the University of Georgia’s
concussion management policy as the model for other universities to adopt. Jennifer Mayerle, UGA Takes
Layered Approach to Concussions, CBS (Dec. 18, 2012 8:14 AM), http://www.cbsatlanta.com/story/
19564028/uga-takes-layered-approach-to-concussions (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
250. Infra Part III.A.
251. See Gregg Easterbrook, Time to Focus on Excesses of Practice, ESPN (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/espn/page2/story/_/id/6906007/tmq-says-time-focus-safety-football-practice (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (noting that jurisdictions are split on this practice).
252. Supra note 145.
253. Douglas A. Wolfe, Why High School Football Needs NFL Limitations, ILL. SCH. BD. J. 34 (Nov.–
Dec. 2011).
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254

than a fully developed adult brain. Therefore, there is a strong argument that
“it’s [unreasonable] to . . . take a young scholar athlete at an age that is more
vulnerable and have them play more dangerously than at the highest professional
255
level.”
The NCAA, high school governing bodies, and individual schools can shield
themselves from potential liability by adopting this policy. There may be an
argument that because concussions in youth and high school football account for
256
the majority of TBI in all youth sports, and that a youth’s developing brain is
257
more susceptible to injury and aggravation, that there should be even more
reduced contact practices. However, the inherent risk in football and the
assumption of the risk that players take by voluntarily playing would likely shield
258
259
a school or coach from liability if they conducted one “contact” or “padded”
260
practice per week. Since the NFL adopted its standard by consulting industry
experts, the entities not adhering to this policy would have a difficult time
arguing that the burden of this practice is greater than the combined magnitude
261
and probability for serious injury.
Pop Warner football is a refreshing example of the emerging custom of
262
limiting contact at the lower levels of football. High schools and universities
should follow suit with the NFL and Pop Warner and begin to limit the amount
of contact in two-a-days, in-season practice, and eliminate any drill that
263
unnecessarily increases the risk of injury. By implementing contact policies
similar to the NFL’s, lower levels of football will shield players from additional
contact that could lead to injury, while at the same time lowering the risk of
264
litigation by decreasing the amount of unnecessary contact.

254. Preventing Preventable Brain Injuries, supra note 23, at 726.
255. See Wolfe, supra note 253, at 34 (quoting Dr. Robert Cantu, a leader in the field of neurology—
specifically CTE).
256. See Gilchrist et al., supra note 32, at 1341 (illustrating that football accounts for 20.7 percent of all
concussions in athletes ages ten to fourteen and 30.3 percent in athletes ages fifteen to nineteen).
257. Preventing Preventable Brain Injuries, supra note 23, at 722.
258. See supra note 63 (defining “contact” within the context of the NFL CBA).
259. See supra note 65 (defining “padded” within the context of the NFL CBA).
260. Supra Part IV.A.
261. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 (2010).
262. See Gregg Easterbrook, Football Finally Focusing on Practice, ESPN (Aug. 14, 2012),
http://espn.go.com/espn/playbook/story/_/id/8265669/pop-warner-rules-limiting-contact-practice-showfootball-taking-head-injuries-seriously (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“[N]oting that more
concussions occur in practice than in games, cut back on the amount of contact allowed in practice, while
banning the Oklahoma-style drill in which players run toward each other and smash helmets”).
263. Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 1005 (2003).
264. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The lower levels of football have the ability to prevent what happened to
265
Blake Ripple. Although playing football always has the potential to cause
injury, state legislatures, governing bodies, schools, and universities have an
obligation to prevent avoidable injuries. The NFL has made great strides in the
266
past five years to address the concussion issue in football. The customs it has
developed through rules and policies are already trickling down to the lower
267
levels of football and other sports. Now, youth, high school, and college
football need to run with the ball. In order to preserve the long-term health and
safety of young players, as well as shield themselves from liability, schools and
268
universities must begin to implement the customs established by the NFL. As
science and medicine develop better treatment and practices, the sports industry
will likely see the NFL incorporate the newest and best concussion management
practices, and everyone else should follow suit.

265.
266.
267.
268.

Supra Part V.
Supra Part III.
Supra Part V.
Supra Part I.
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